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VALUES AND АТТITUDES IN LANGUAGE STANDARDIZАТТОМ
1. Referring to Jespersen's article in Scientia (1914, p. 228 ff) and his
famous book Мапkind, Nation and Individual from a Linguistic Point of
Иieto (1925), В. Нavranek begins his paper at the 4th International Соngress
of Linguists at Copenhagen (1936) with the following guestion: „Ist über
haupt die Sprachnorm, die Normierung der Schriftsprache und die Sprach
kultur ein Thema der Linguistik, gehört dies zu ihren wissenschaftlichen
Аufgaben? Soll der Sprachforscher nur Веobachter bleiben oder kann er
selbst eingreifen?" Наvranek himself and his colleagues and followers from
the Prague Linguistic School answered the question positively, elaborated
a theory of standard language and its standardization (and cultivation), and
succeeded in practical applications of it. Even though their endeavour has
not remained restricted to Czech and Slovak only," this aspect of Prague
School linguistics has become far less known than some others.
In fact, the Prague School linguistics has offered the first theory of the Standard
Language (SL) and thus furnished the activities of „normative linguistics", „language
planning" etc., with a scientific base. The said theory may be summarizingly characterized
* See Actes du Quatriёте Сопgrёs International de Linguistes, Сopenhagen, 1936,
pp. 151—156. Reprinted in J. Vachek (ed.), А Prague School Reade in Linguistics, ВПо
omington, 1964, pp. 413—420.
* Тhe functional theory of the standard language (influenced by ideas of some
Russian and Soviet scholars) has been accepted and applied not only in Slavonic languages,
but elswhere, even in South America (P. L. Garvin: Тhe standard language problem:
concepts and methods, reprinted in: От Linguistic Method, The Hague, 1964, 153—158.
Same: Аspectos sociolinguisticos de la lingua nacional: La experiencia checa y el trabajo
cie la Escuela de Praga, in: Prograтa interaтericano de Lingйistica e Ensino de Linguas.
О simpósio de Sao Paulo, 1969.). Тhe renewed interest of Soviet linguists in the theore
tical problems of SL (cf., at least, the volume Aktual'nyje probleту kultury reёi, Мoskva
1970, and the corresponding chapters in the first volume of Obséee jazykoznanie, Мoskva
1971) explicitely carries on these functional traditions. — Аn overview may be found in
А. Jedliéka, Spisovny jazyk p soиêasnё kотитikaci (Standard language in present-day com
munication), Praha 1974.
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by the following three principles: (1) functionalism, (2) normativism, (3) dynamic synchro
nism. According to (1), SL is determined and delimited by the specific (social) functions
to which it is called forth to serve;** the highest evaluating criterion is, therefore, the ade
фuacy of the given means to the given function; the system of the means of SL3 reveals
inner functional differentiation and stylistic dissimilation; the main types of special uti
lization for different functions are: intelectualization (rationalization), automation and
desautomation (foregrounding). Ассоrding to (2) the dichotomy of norm vs. codification
is established: the norm, defined as the ensemble of language means obligatorily used,
underlines the inherent (intrinsic, imanent) character of it (it exists within the language,
is a genuine social phenomenon, connected with the institutional character of language"
and cannot be simply identified with linguistic usage without the qualification „collecti
ve"), whereas the codification of the norm (in the form of various „normative" handbooks,
dictionaries, school-grammars) represents a phenomenon existing outside the language,
serving practical aims and enabling the linguists to influence the norm in a desirable di
rection. Ассоrding to (3) the optimal state of SL is that of flexible stability (dynamic ba
ance).
In the latest decade or so we have witnessed in the world a new inte
rest in the social aspect of language study and in practical questions of stan
dardization, language planning, normative or prescriptive linguistics, insti
tutional linguistics, practical linguistics, language policy, or what names may
be applied to the given phenomena. When trying to ascertain the reasons
** А general characterization (though not a definition) of SL may be found in
„Thёses", published in ТСLР 1 (1929, p. 16): „La distinction de la langue littéraire se
fait grâce au rôle qu'elle joue, grace en particulier aux exigences supérieures qu'elle se voit
imposer, en comparaison du langage populaire: la langue littéraire exprime la vie de cul
ture et de civilisation (fonctionnement et résultats de la pensée scientifique, philosophique
et religieuse, politique et sociale, juridique et administrative)". — Р. Garvin and. М. Ма
thiot (cf. Тhe standard language problem, p. 155) tried to define SL as „a codified form
of language, accepted by, and serving as a model to, a large community" and — developing
the Prague tradition — proposed three sets of criteria for ascertaining the degree of lan
guage standardization: (1) the intrinsic properties of SL, (2) the functions of SL within
the culture of a community, (3) the attitudes of the community towards SL. — Тhe recent
Soviet definitions of SL (op. cit. in Note 2, underline the historical character of the cate
gory of SL and — in contradistinction to substandard varieties of a national language —
its highest social position, and elaboratedness of its norm, as well as the richness of its
stylistic differentiation according to its numerous specific communicative functions in the
sphere of culture and civilization.
* Тhe term „means of language" (Сz.: „jazykovё prostfedky") seems to be not
customary and guite clear in English, but it is justified by the functional conception of
language, as it has been formulated in the „Theses": „la language est un systéme de moyens
d'expression appropriés a un but" (see „Theses présentées au Premier Сongrès des phi
lologues slaves", ТСLР I, 1929, 5).
* Тhe influence of Durkheim (mediated also by de Saussure) may be traced here;
cf. also Е. Сoseriu: Sisteта, потта у habla, Мontevideo 1952.
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and incentives of this new interest and orientation, we find that they derive
both from the immanent development of the linguistic science as a whole,
and from the extralinguistic social factors. Let us mention at least the follo
wing ones: (1) the onesidedness of the descriptivist as well as generativist
approach, the traditions of the anthropological linguistics and ethnolinguis
tics in America, and the European functionalist 1inguistic tradition (with
its forrunners, e.g. Noreen," Jespersen); (2) the increasing interest in lan
guages of Africa, and South and East Asia (revealing unexpectedly compli
cated relations between political, ethnical, social and linguistic structures,
and a very deep linguistic stratification and diversification"); (3) the revival
of nationalism; (4) the impact of practical needs of language standardization
and planning in newly created or not yet fully established standard langua
ges; (5) the impact of modern technique and technology (automation, infor
mation retrieval, etc.), bringing forth new aspects and activities of „applied
linguistics", and, at the same time, calling forth some deliberate changes
and modifications of linguistic standards (e.g., of technical terminology);
(6) the recent interest of science in transitional or boundary domains bet
ween adjacent disciplines."
* А. Noreen, Uber Sprachrichtigkeit IF 1 (1892), 95—157. Noreen’s ideas provok
ed a discussion (cf. Jespersen's book Мапkind, Nation and Individual..., Сh. V) and in
fluenced, to a certain degree, some Prague School linguists as well (thus, e.g., V. Маthe
sius, in his programmative article from 1932 О роёadaoku stability ve spisovтёт фазусе
(Тhe requirement of stability for a standard language) rejects the criterion of „historical
purity" as well as „a total freedom and arbitrariness" and recommends „the principle of
practical serviceability": the parallelism to Noreen’s criteria, namely the „literary-histo
rical" view (or, more precisely, linguistic-historical), the „natural-historical" view (lais
ser faire), and the „rational" view (standard of expediency), seems to be evident.
* Сf. the following statement by the sociologist J. Useem „Sociologists accustomed
to a society that coincides with a nation-state would find in many non-Western societies
пunique opportunities to explore the issues originally posed by Park on the role of language
in society". Items, 17 (1963), No 3, p. 29 f.
* Сf. Actes du X" Сопgrёs international des linguistes, I, Вucharest, 1969, p. 75—111.
Тhe import of boundary domains was pointed out by Engels and by the founder of cyberne
tics, N.Wiener. It is worth noting that Wiener— whose father was a philologist— expressed
some very interesting opinions concerning the correctness of language, esp. in his book
Нитан Use of Нитат Веіngs. Суbernetics and Society. Оn the one hand he disregards
grammatical purism and school authoritarianism, but on the other hand he fully under
stands the merits of О. Jespersen for a scientifically grounded theory of the standard
шаnguage. Wiener rightly assumes that the primary task of the study of grammar is to
discover what „code" we use in fact, but, at the same time, he is fully aware of the fact
that „in the more subtle study of language the normative questions play their role and are
of a very different character. They are the highest and finest flower of the problems of
communication, but they do not constitute their most fundamental stage".
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It is worth noting that the question posited by Havránek was raised
and answered anew by В. Нaugen some thirty years later. In his paper Lin
guistics and language planning" he tries „to formulate once again, for our
generation, the nature of linguistic normalization and the potential role of
the linguist in codifying norms and giving them the sanction of authority".
Не proposes to be „neither pro-nor anti-normative, but to insist that cor
rectness in language is a linguistic problem and …is worth of the attention
of linguistic science". Не assumes that the line separating the prescriptive
and the descriptive activities is a thin one, and „in our day of social science,
the description of norms and values is not regarded as an entirely unscien
tific procedure" … „Еven if this is not a pure science, it is unduestionably
an application of linguistic technology which will classify as one branch of
applied linguistics"."
It appears that it is the notion of social values and of evaluation that
is mostly responsible for the periodically recurrent hesitations of linguists
to acknowledge the problems of language standardization" as a legitimate
branch of linguistics. This situation has been sharply characterized by J.
Оrenstein:11
* See: W. Вright (ed.), Sociolinguistics, Proceedings of the UCLA Sociolinguistic
Сonference (1964), The Hague, 1966, p. 50 ff.
* Нашgen's older standpoint seems to be somewhat weaker. In his article Planning
for a Standard Language in Norway (Anthropological Linguistics 1959, 1) he says: „Lin
guists tend to look askance on normative linguistics, because it brings in an element which
is not purely scientific ... Linguistics as such is obviously not equipped to deal with these
problems, which belong in the realm of social and political values. Вut linguists will no
фоubt continue to leave opinions on the subject". Нашgen's new position is probably due
to the recent development of sociolinguistics and to the influence of the Prague theory of
SL (cf., e.g., his use of the Praguian terms „codification of norms").
** I wonder what term to use in order to cover the whole field of activities under
ciscussion (cf. here on page 4). I prefer, in English, the term „standardization" (used,
e.g., in the title of P.S. Ray’s book, see Note 19), though I do not find it ideal, the etymo
logical relationship to „standard languages" showing advantages as well as disadvantages.
In my usage, standardization also covers Маthesius and Науranek’s „cultivation of lan
guage". (Сf. also Neustupny’s „policy approach" and „cultivation approach".)
** In the discussion of V. Ташli's paper on the theory of „practical linguistics"
at the 9th Соngress of Linguists, 1962 (see Proceedings of the Соngress, The Наgue 1964,
р. 608 f.). Ташli's book Introduction to a Theory of Language Planning (Uppsala 1968)
should be remembered in this connection. — А comprehensive treatment of „language
planning" presents the collective volume Сan language be planned? (edited by J. Rubin
and В. Jermudd), Ноnolulu 1971 (cf. especially the contribution by J. Rubin „Еvalution
and language planning", 217—252).
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„It is no exageration to say that sociolinguistics has been one of the most neglected
areas of our field. While the social scientists have not hesitated to intervene in virtually
every aspect of human affairs, linguists, by contrast, have suffered from inhibitions as
regards the study and analysis of social phenomena into which, as specialists in communi
cation, they might have insight. Аs a result of this timidity, linguists have often remained
outside the mainstream of events, concerning themselves exclusively with technical mat
ters".
Аnyone who is not blinded by some kind of purely formalistic approach
must acknowledge that language is a social phenomenon kat’exokhen and,
consequently, the science of language ranks among social sciences.* Re
cognizing this we have to do with the crucial guestion of modern scientism,
namely that of the so-called „value-neutrality" in social sciences. First
of all a perfect detachment of values is impossible in any science whatsoever.
Тhis fact is conceded not only by theoreticians of social sciences, such as
С. L. Stevenson* or С. V. Мills," but also by theorists such as E. Nagel,""
whose approach and statements are more rigorous. Аs for the social sciences
(sciences of man), it is evident that they inevitable have to do with values
and evaluation, the more so in the case of their practical applications.*"
Investigations in sociolinguistics have certain social values among their
objects (thus language itself is a social value), and therefore they cannot do
without evaluating judgements.
** Аs for the important difference between the social sciences and the other ones,
cf. the following statement by К. Вoulding „For all the attempts of our positivists to de
humanize the sciences of man, a moral science it remains". (Оuoted from the book of
С. W. Мills, referred to here below, Note 14).
** Сf., e.g. С.L. Stevenson, Ethics and Language, Yale University Press, 1944,
p. 161: „No inquiry can divorce itself from the evalution considerations that directly
concern and guide the process of inquiry itself". Тhe highest possible degree of detach
ment in any science, including mathematics and logic, is to limit oneself „solely to those
evaluations which are essential to the pursuit of its descriptive and clarificatory studies"
(ibid.).
14 Сf. С. V. Мills, The Sociological Imagination, New York, 1961, p. 78: „Values
are involved in the selection of the problems we study; values are also involved in certain
of the key conceptions we use in our formulation of these problems, and values affect
the course of their solution. So far as conceptions are concerned, the aim ought to be to
use as many „value-neutral" terms as possible and to become aware of and to make expli
cit the value implications that remain".
** Сf. Е. Nagel, The Structure of Science, New York 1961, p. 485 ff.
19 Сf. С. W. Мills: „Work in social science has always been accompanied by pro
blems of evaluation" (op. cit., 76), and „То detect practical problems is to make evalu
tions" (ibid., 90).
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Вefore going into the problems of evaluation in the process of stan
dardization, let us briefly sketch the content of this kind of activities. Lan
guage standardization may be divided into three stages: (1) descriptive,
(2) normative, (3) performative."
(1) In the descriptive stage, the existing norms (in the sense
given to this term by the Prague School linguists) of SL are ascertained
and described in a fully objective way, taking account of all their comple
xity and of the inner differentiation and dynamism of SL. Аlso the different
social values ascribed to SL, to its particular means and to their communi
cative use, as well as various beliefs and attitudes towards SL shared by the
given language community have to be objectively stated (employing also
procedures of sociological research).
(2) Тhe normative (or reg u 1ative) stage may be de
vided into two sub-stages: (a) the evaluative s., and (b) the prescriptives.
(or the codification).
(а) Тhe eva1uative stage, employing a set of objective criteria, should
aifferentiate (discriminate) the language means according to the degree of
their suitability. Аt the same time, the actual social needs of expression, and
the trends andtendencies, revealing the immanent dynamism of the SL-norm,
have to be estimated as well as the (inconsistent) system of social beliefs
and attitudes evaluated (objectively, in a critical way), with the objective
of proposing a tentative prospect (or plan) of SL.
(b) Тhe co dification of the SL-norm, resulting from the previous
stages of standardization, has the chance to be an effective instrument for
a planned and prospective influencing of SL. In our conception, codifica
tion must not be treated as a rigid, static, dogmatic, and authoritarian pres
cription of the laws of „correct language", but as a tool, of an institutional
character, controlling the desirable dynamic balance of SL and ensuring
its relatively smooth functioning according to the actual social needs of
** In the Preface to his book Facts and Иalues (Yale University Press, 1963), С. L.
Stevenson distinguished three branches of ethics: (1) descriptive e., studying moral prac
tices and convictions, i.e., what has been considered good, obligatory, etc.; (2) normative
е., seeking to reach conclusions (and systematize them under general principles) not about
what others have considered good, etc., but such ones as are intended to supplement,
back up, or stand in opposition to what others have considered good, etc.; (3) analytical e.,
surveying normative e. with the intent of clarifying its problems and terminology and
examining reasons by which its conclusions may be supported. — Parallelism between (1),
(2) and language standardization seems to me obvious); as for (3), considerations of the
kind as our paper reveal the said „analytical" character.
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expression. In other words: codification should represent a theoretically
founded application of the scientific knowledge of language and of its func
tioning in the solution of practical problems of social communication.
Needless to say, the character, and the chances of possible effect of
such codification are different in different sections of language (e.g., it is
certainly easier to standardize spelling than pronounciation), or in different
SL's and in different sociolinguistic situations.**
(3) Тhe performative stage requires the ascertainment and
employment of all suitable ways of making codification operative in social
practice. It is less scientific and less linguistic than the other stages; rather
an art than a science, but an important art, to be sure.
In the following sections of our paper we shall deal with two topics
connected with the theoretical problems of standardization which have been
mentioned or implied in Prague School writings, but call for further theore
tical elaboration: (1) the justification of evaluative judgements, and the as
certainment of objective evaluating criteria in language standardization,
(2) the inquiry into the system of attitudes of a community to its language.
2. Веfore taking up the first question, we have to state that the eva
1uative orientation is essential to any activity in the field of language stan
dardization, whether such orientation will be found compatible with scien
tific objectivity, or not. Standardization means making decisions: the stan
dardizer has to select from several possibilities, and such a selection pre
supposes evaluation according to certain criteria. Further, the very notions
of standardization and planning involve changes of language, accomplished,
passing through, expected, or planned: languages undergo changes, they
can change (or, can be changed), so that the essence of standardization and
planning lies in the evaluation of linguistic changes or innovations. (The
term „change" or „innovation" has to be taken in a very broad sense: a lan
guage change may consist not only in the rise of a new form, construction,
or rule, but also in the disappearance of some forms previously existing, in
restriction or extension of the validity of a rule, in preferring some forms and
** Сf. В. Нayranek, Ukoly spisovného jazyka a jeho kultura, Spisoond destina a
jazykova kultura, Praha 1932, p. 32—84 (the second part of this paper has been translated
into English in P. Garvin (ed.), А Prague School Reader on Esthetics, Literary Structure
and Style, Georgetown University Press, 1964, and into Russian in N. А. Коndrasov (ed.),
Рra3skij lingvistiёeskij kruёok, Мoskva 1967), and Оbecné zasady pro kulturu jazyka, ibid.,
p. 245—258. Сf. also further studies by Havranek, collected in the volume Studie o spi
soonёт jazyce, Praha 1963.
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pushing back others, in changes of stylistic characteristics of various language
means, etc.). Оne has only to agree with the Indian scholar P.S. Ray,19
„Instead of considering all changes to be equally likely, equally costly, equally
far-reaching or edually unbalancing, it (=standardization) distinguishes
between changes as unequal in these or other respects". Тhe heart of stan
dardization is „the search of reasonableness in the discrimination oflinguistic
innovations" (18). Вriefly speaking: there is no standardization without dis
crimination, and, consequently, without evaluation.
Тhis being so, let us ask: does any discrimination and evaluation entai1
a loss of „value-neutrality", i.e., a commitment to some value(s)? Do wе,
in any case, abandon value-neutrality, when speaking about values? As a
real object of social sciences, values can be neither negated, nor relegated
out of the scope of their interest; the problem consists in their objective
treat1ment.
Моdern theory of science makes distinction between factual and value
judgements; in terms of this distinction we may reformulate our duestion
as follows: Does any statement concerning values represent, eo ipso, a value
judgement? Еvidently it does not, since we may state different beliefs and
attitudes of persons or of group of them as merely objectively existing facts,
without expressing our subjective agreement (disagreement) with, or approval
(disapproval) of, these values, so that our beliefs and attitudes are not in
volved in such statements. Thus, e.g., if I state: „Some people distaste the
use of foreign words in Czech", I am making a factual statement about an
attitude, but not a value judgement, since I am not expressing my own at
titude and belief, as it would be the case when saying „The use of foreign
words in Czech is distasteful for me and ought to be avoided" (or, in a pseu
do-objective formulation, „The use … is undesirable and ought to be avoi
ded", when speaking qиd linguist with an authoritarian attitude).
Summarizingly: employing the distinction between sentences about
values, and those expressing them,"" we are able to distinguish between
factual and value judgements, and assure our scientific value-neutrality when
accounting for social values and treating them.
Nevertheless, the statements occuring in the process of language stan
dardization not only assess attitudes and beliefs concerning language and
communication in a given community, but also ascribe certain values to
** P. S. Ray, Language Standardization. Studies in Prescriptive Linguistics, The
Нague, 1963, p. 17.
** Тhis distinction, pointed out by С. Stevenson (Facts and Иalues, p. 204 ff.),
can be found (with various terminology) in a number of writers.
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particular language forms, etc., to different ways of using them, and make
evaluations and recommendations. Is it possible to assure the scientific
objectivity in such cases too?
In connection with these problems two other distinctions seem to be
relevant. The first one is that worked out by E. Nagel (op.с.): Тhe so-called
value judgements either express an approval (or disapproval) of some ideal,
action, etc., or they express an estimate of the degree to which some com
monly recognized (or clearly defined) characteristic is present (or absent)
in a given instance. The first kind of value judgements he calls „appraising
judgements", the second one „characterizing judgements". It is clear, that
the latter are „value-free", scientifically objective, since they do not entail
any commitment to a certain ideal or value standard.
In fact, characterizing judgements are found in any science. It is evi
dent that such linguistic statements, as „The noun тоiher contains six let
ters“, „teacher is a derived word", „achenial is a rare technical expression",
etc., etc., belong to this sort, as well as „The plural formation of the type
теп, feet is highly restricted and belongs to the periphery of the system of
МоdЕ morphology", „Тhe spelling based on phonological principle is easier
from the point of view of acquisition and writing“, „The German verbal
forms of the 3rd person plural function also as forms of respect of the 2nd
person", etc. In all cases the statement concerns an objectively statable
characteristic or property of a language phenomenon and its employment
in communication.
Standardization activities, however, cannot confine themselves to these
„recognoscative" statements only: they follow a practical aim of influencing
SL by means of codification, which presupposes making evaluations and
cirawing conclusions. Let us quote P.S. Ray once more: „Тhat all linguistic
forms are worth study and report does not entail that all are to be, against
all empirical evidence, represented as equal in value…" (о.с., 17). In other
words: the estimative statements of the type „The language phenomenon X
has shown the characteristica (in… degree)" should be supplied by estimate
of their value(s), and by a normative conclusion. Тhus „evaluation" in our
case means „assessment of a value of a linguistic phenomenon". Мау such
judgements be considered likewise estimative, and not appraising judgements
(in Nagel’s sense)?
Оur affirmative answer is based on the following supposition: Values
may be divided (according to modern theory of value, cf. С. Stevenson),
into two fundamentally different classes, viz. intrinsic and extrinsic values.
Аn in tr in sic value of a phenomenon is that which is considered its
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(ultimate) end, which makes the phenomenon worth for its own sake, not
as a means to something else. An extrin sic value of a phenomenon
is its serviceability as a means for attaining an end. The assignment of in
trinsic values to objects and actions (as well as the (dis).approval of them)
1ies out of the field of any social science (these values may be only scienti
fically, objectively stated as existing in relation to a social group), while
duestions about extrinsic values belong to the competence of science, since
these values are derived from objective facts, namely from the functional
(teleonomic, finalist) relation between a phenomenon and its possibleem
ployment to a given end." То give an ad oculos example: the statement about
the serviceability of guns to the end of killingpeopleinwars is scientifically
justified, irrespective of the fact whether we approve or disapprove of such
killing. In other words: an extrinsic value is an objective property of a pheno
menon, since both arguments of the functional relation (i.e., the phenome
non and the end to which it can be subservient) exist independently of the
judging subject and his beliefs and attitudes.
Аdequacy of the functional approach in sociolinguistics seems to me unquestio
nable, since this branch is concerned with purposive human behaviour, with its means and
ends. I have no intent to discuss here the complicated problems of functionalism in social
sciences (a thorough-going analysis has been offered by E. Nagel, op. cit.). I only wish
to point out that the so-called functionalism of the Prague School linguistics is to be sought
just in its overall teleonomic explanatory principle (the fundamental terms of which being
"ends", "means" and 'reasons (motives)"), which is different from, but fully compatible
with and complemental to the causal explanation, operating with causes and consequen
ces.* — Тhe views of contemporory Soviet and other Маrxist philosophers and biologists
on purposive explanation has been summarized by R. Löther in Biologie und Weltanschau
ипg (Leipzig — Jena — Веrlin 1972). Не makes a principal distinction between „purpo
sive activity" of thinking human beings, directed to a consciously determined goal on the
one hand, and „biological purposiveness (teleonomy)" characterizing objectively given
organization of systems of living beings, on the other hand. Сonnections, processes, quali
ties and ways of behaviour of living organisms are purposive in the sense that in certain
environment they contribute to the development and to the maintenance of the existence
of individuals and the species. Thus the notion of purposiveness in biology expresses re
lations, and such terms as adaptibility, function, role, ... are here relevant. Вiological pur
posiveness (teleonomy) has a relative character: in all cases it relates to certain conditions
of environment, and the living beings not always are organized fully in a purposive way
** Тhe position of the notion "function" in respect to the "means — ends relation
is given by the following statement: If we say that an item x has a function f, we mean
that the item x serves (as a means) to an end F.
** In my opinion, В. Russell’s discussion of it in his essay „Оn the notion of cause"
(in: Procedings of the Aristotelian society 1913), which cleared this principle from its su
pranatural associations, religious misinterpretation, has not lostits significance. А renewed
interest in these problems now appears among the philosophers as well as natural scientists.
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(in relation to the given environment). То conclude, the notin of „telonomy" avoids both
„mechanical determinism" and „idealistic teleology (metaphysical vitalism)", while it is
in accord with the principles of „dialectic determinism". — „Language as a psycho-bio
logical and psycho-social structure" (N. А. Веrnstejn) underlies human linguistic conducts
and behaviour and the teleonomic conception enables us to extend the interpretion in terms
of purposiveness (goal—directedness) on the unconscious („biological") components of
1anguage and linguistic behaviour as well.
Тhus we may conclude that the "means-ends relation is value-free.
Тhe means-value of language facts may be stated by estimative judgement
(with the exclusion of any appraising judgement) under the supposition that
the set of end-values (i.e., of the possible functions) is neither ascribed nor
approved (or disapproved) by the linguist (when judging qиd linguist). In
other words, the task of sociolinguists is to ascertain (in the form of a factual
judgement) the set of functions (values), ascribed by the given community
to language and communication, as mere given facts, without expressing
appraising judgements about them, without commitment to this system of
values," and to express estimative judgements concerning particular lan
guage meanS.
Тhis, of course, does not mean that the linguist should never express
personal, subjective evaluation of his own, voice his approval or disapproval
with certain believes or attitudes, recommend, persuade or dissuade. Оn the
contrary, I think that he ought to do all this, since his beliefs and attitudes
might be to a high degree positively influenced by his scientificknowledge**
(in fact, however, the differences between linguists as regards their apprai
sing judgements, their attitudes to different standardization problems and
desicions, are sometimes surprisingly enormous). Вut all this may be regar
ded as justified on one condition only, viz. that in all cases the linguist expli
citly and clearly draws the line of demarcation between the objective scien
tific statements, and his personal views and ideals.
Тhe systems of linguistic values in different language communities may be
more or less different. They depend on the overall value-orientation of the com
munity, which may be characterized for example in terms of a modified Parsons’
system of value patterns with five variables; there are two opposite sets of these variables:
** Сf. the following characteristic by Stevenson (op. cit., p. 92): „А social scientist
attempts to survey people's evaluations with a temporary detachment — for survey them
without as yet taking sides, and thus without as yet participating in the normative issues
that may occasion". (Вut Stevenson does not fully identify himself with this approach.)
** Сf. also the following statement of Мills (op. c., p. 79): „Whether he wants it
or not, or whether he is aware of it or not, anyone who spends his life studying society
and publishing the results is acting morally and usually politically as well".
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А В
(1) rationality — affectivness
(2) specificity — diffuseness
(3) universalism — particularism
(4) effeciency — quality
(5) long-term aims — short-term aims
Тhere exist 32 different possible combinations (i.e., patterns with five variables, e.g.,
1 А, 2 В, 3 В, 4 А, 5 А), characterizing different language communities in different so
ciolinguistic settings and situations. (Thus, e.g., the dominance of the set В often occurs
in the stage of constituting a SL, and this orientation appears, under such circumstances,
duite natural and to a high degree also as functionally justified.) Оf course this does not
mean that the presence of a variable of one set presupposes, in a particular case, the total
absence of the opposite member of the pair; but one of the two members appears as do
minant.
I do not intend to discuss these problems here, since a related topic will be dealt
with in section 3 of this paper (in connection with the dialectics of attitudes); one exam
ple will suffice to clear the point: Let us suppose that in a language two different technical
terms, a and b are available, for one and the same object, a being a well-formed expression
of a domestic origin, but very rarely used by the technicians, while b an ill-formed expres
sion, partly of a foreign origin, but very firmly rooted in technical usage. In a community
whose value orientation contains 4 В as one of dominant value variables, viz. "quality",
the term a will be chosen and recommended as an official standard term. Вut in another
community, highly evaluating 'efficiency (4 А)", the term b will be preferred: it is much
more common and, conseduently, it is cheaper to continue to use it than to learn to use b.**
Аnother important point is the difference between overt and covert end
-values. Thus deceiving, telling lies, or obscuring one’s intentions does not mostly belong
among overtly accepted or proclaimed social values, nevertheless some people do this
and are expected to behave so; and it is evident that in doing so they make use of suitable
means and ways of language communication. Тhe linguist qиd linguist can only objectively
state different degrees of serviceability of this or that linguistic means to this „obscure"
end (function), without raising moralist judgements disapproving (or approving) this kind
of behaviour.**
It has been pointed out by Мyrda1** and others that people ascribe intrinsic values
not only to ends, but also to means. In this wording the statement is logically untenable,
since the only value of a means as such is its expediency for the given end; the notion
** Тhe estimate of efficiency in terms of cost of acauisition and maintenance has
been proposed by P.S. Ray (op. с., ch. 1, 2). — In our example, even if we admit that it
is easier to learn (acguire) the regular form a than the irregular one b for those who have
not yet got accustomed to either of them, the continuity of using the customary, deep-roo
ted form b is evidently more economic (efficient), in respect to the much higher number
of those accustomed to b and in respect to the fact that this form will in any case survive
in the until then existing technical literature at least.
** А very interesting treatment of the guestion of the responsibility of language
for telling lies will be found in Н. Weinrich, Linguistik der Lige, Неіdelberg 1966.
** G. Муrdal, Value in Social Theory, London 1958, pp. XXII, 211—213.
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"means" acquires its sense in relation to an end only, being a means" is a purely relational
property. What is really meant by Мyrdal's statement is the fact that a social phenomenon,
appearing as a means (i.e., an efficient one) in respect to a given end, may, at the same time
or subsequently, be viewed as an end (of course, different from that to which it functions
as a means) or as a fact beyond the means-ends nexus, and as such it can acauire an in
trinsic social value. Тhe well known dictum saying that means are sanctioned by their
ends is, from the purely functional point of view, undoubtedly correct. Вut it is as well
true that social phenomena simultaneously enter into very different relationships; from
the fact that a phenomenon can satisfy a certain end does not follow that it cannot satisfy
another end (or that it must satisfy any other end), neither that it cannot be regarded also
as an end, having an intrinsic value.
In this connection it is possible to refer to an idea of Каrl Маrx, expressed on page
1 of his Capital. Не maintains that any useful thing is a sum of many dualities and there
fore it can be useful in many respects; the utility of anything is conditioned by the auali
ties of that thing and does not exist without them.
Тhe problematic character of the notional distinction between "means and "ends"
was pointed out by J. Dewey; according to him these terms are two different names for
the same reality; they denote not a division in reality, but a distinction in judgement only.**
We can agree with him, of course, only in the sense that the said distinction cannot be sta
ted as a permanent, inherent, substantial quality of real objects or actions, but only as a
typically relational property of them. Вut in respect to a particular case of means-ends
relation, this distinction is necessarily accompanied with a „distinction in reality", since
the same object or action cannot represent an end and simultaneously a means for this
same end. In other words, the two arguments of a functional relation R between an end and
(one of) its means may be only two different objects or actions. Generally speaking: if
R is the said asymmetrical irreflexive relation, and zo, x, y, z, different objects or actions
acquiring these values, then the forms of the type x R x, y Rу, ... are excluded; the pos
sible forms are only of the type x Rу, з R x, or 2 R до (i.e., cases where x being a means
in relation to y, is also an end in relation to g, or where 2 is a means not only in relation
to x, but also to co).
То sum up: From our above considerations follows that the value
judgements of standardization display relative character." Their relativity
may be considered in four different dimensions: (1) the relativity condi
tioned by the inevitable limitations of our knowledge (with the perspective
of further corrections, supplements, etc.); (2) the validity of our statements
is relative to certain circumstances and contexts, to various social moments
(of local, temporal and other characters); (3) the relativity is involved in
the relational essence of the extrinsic character of means-value; (4) from the
estimative character of manyvaluejudgements follows that they assess diffe
rent degrees of characteristics: there is a whole scale of graded values bet
28 See J. Dewey, Нитат Nature and Conduct, New York 1930, p. 34.
** Сf also Ray's statement: „Оne may judge without judging absolutely" (ор. с.,
p. 16).
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ween the positive and the negative poles (such as „suitable — unsuitable").
It is exactly this point that is often neglected by many standardizers and
in normative handbooks.89
When examining different linguistic value judgements or standardi
zation recommendations (decisions) we find out that they make recourse
to three different sets of objective criteria: (1) to the first group belong those
cases, when the linguist is stating the presence or absence (in the SL norm),
and the degree of commonalty and social acceptibility of a given language
form or of its way of employment; (2) in the second group we find state
ments assessing the degree of neccessity and serviceability of a form or of
a way of employment (in respect to a certain language function); (3) the
third group consists of statements about the regularity or systematicity of
a given form or way of employment.
It seems apparent that only group (2) represents estimative judge
ments of the type we have discussed above, i.e. judgements involving the
means-ends relation. Does that mean that the other two groups of judgements
are not scientifically justified? А close inspection detects that the under
lying criteria of groups (1) and (3) follow from two essential properties of
language and its use, namely (1) from the institutional, and (3) from these
miotic character of language. In any case, such judgements are necessarily
of estimative character, since they ascertain the presence or absence of a
property, and the degree of it. Вut, in certain sense, they, too, do not stand
beyond the means-ends nexus, since we may assume that the essential, in
trinsic, „natural" properties of a phenomenon (properties objectively sta
table) cannot be irrelevant to the employment of this phenomenon as a
means to a certain end. Оn the contrary, we may rightly suppose that the
instrumental function (value) of SL (as well as other possible manipulative
and declarative functions (values) of it) are conditioned by its essential,
natural properties, viz. by its semiotic and institutional character. It is just
these properties that makes SL a suitable means for the said ends. In this
sense, the two properties may be considered „natural values" of SL. I find
it in accord with J. Locke's statement that the „natural worth" of anything
rests in its capability to satisfy people’s needs, duoted with approval by К.
Мarx in his Capital". Such values of a socialphenomenon maybe ascertained
** Flaws of other sorts, incompatible with the scientific objectivity, may be found
in the process of standardization as well. Not rarely do we meet judgements that are rather
subjective (based on idiosyncrasies), authoritarian, dogmatic, etc.
** К. Маrx identifies (in footnote 4 in the first chapter of Capital) Locke’s „natu
ral worth" wirh his own „Gebrauchswert".
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by means of its empirical analysis. Language can serve as a capable instru
ment of articulated thinking, selfexpression, and, in the first place, of in
terindividual communication on account of the fact that it is a social insti
tution and norm, and a dynamic system of phonic (and graphic) signs.
Тhe institutional and normative character of language deserves some further re
marks. Тhe said character was ascribed to social phenomena by the тagтиs parens of mo
dern sociology E. Durkheim** (whose influence on de Saussure and the Prague linguists
is well known). Sociology regards as an in sti tu ti on any social fact in the moment
when it gets a fixed position as a stable element in the structure of community, the exi
stence of which is maintained by means of social mechanism. It is evident that language
(and especially SL) meets the said conditions: it has a fixed position in the life of commu
nity, based on its most general social functions; it is a relatively stable element (it retains
its social identity) in spite of the fact that it is constantly changing (so that its „material"
identity is often only partial, rather a similarity, and weak), and the continuity of its exi
stence and its balanced development is secured by means of various kinds of social mecha
nism of institutional character, as well as by other means of social control (family, school,
means of codification; literature, mass media; criticism, praise, censure, etc.).
We have already mentioned the intrinsic conception of the language n or m in
the Praguian approach. Even here the influence of Durkheim (also through the mediation
of de Saussure’s ideas, presented by Вally and Sechehay) is to be traced. Ассоrding to
Durkheim, every social fact reveals its normative character: it exists beyond the indivi
dual (is extrinsic to him) and possesses an imperative and oppressive power, enforcing
itself upon the individual, whether he wants or not. Вut in two footnotes Durkheim adds
three very important qualifications: (1) the norms are not accepted by the individual in
a passive way; we often adapt and individualize them;** (2) nevertheless, the possible range
of deviations is limited and varies according to the character of different social facts (it
seems to me that in the case of SL the admissible range of deviations is relatively broad);
(3) the oppressive power of social phenomena has its opposite: the social institutions are
enforced upon us, but at the same time we stick to them; they bind us and we like them,
they force themselves on us and we profit from their oppression. Durkheim seems not to
know how to explain this unexpected and apparently paradoxical state of things — but
those who have recognized the dialectic character of social facts are far from being
surprised. -
Durkheim's conception of the extrinsic status of social norms in relation to indi
viduals (the qualifications (1), (2) are merely stating some important facts, without offe
ring a principled explanation of them) has been criticised by Е. Сoseriu.** Не argues
** Сf. Е. Durkheim, Les règles de la тёthode sociologique, Paris 1895.
** J. Мukatovsky in his book Esteticka fипkсе, потта a hodnota (Praha 1936) points
out the fact that the norm tends to be binding without exceptions, nevertheless it can never
(in its essence) attain the validity of a natural law. The norm not only may be violated (and
in fact it currently is), but in some cases there occur two or even more parallel norms.
Тhe author concludes that the notion of norm is based on a dialectic antinomy between
its validity without exceptions, and a merely regulative character of it.
** See E. Сoseriu, Sincronia, diacronia a historia, Мontevideo 1958; a Russian
translation appeared in Novoje w linguistike III, Мoskva 1963.
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that social facts are, no doubt, independent of this or any other member of the commu
nity, but only under the condition that all other members keep them (i.e., it is independent
of отnibus, but depending on ситctis). Thus social facts are not extrinsic to individuals
-they are not beyond them, but between them, they are inter-individual.** Аnd the norms
are not enforced on individuals by a power existing beyond them (effecting from outside):
the norms are accepted by them and internalized as an obligation in the etymological sense
of the word („binding agreement"). — We may say that Сoseriu's modification of Durk
heim’s (and de Saussure's) conception is very similar to the Prague views (often implied
only in the treatment of SL problems).
It is necessary, too, to correlate the notion of n or m to that of va1u e. From
the sociological point of view every society is determined by a common set of aims (ends),
it must share a common system of institutionalized values. Such values answer the ques
tion „What is desirable?" in a most general way, without specifications as regards special
functions or situations; they belong to the highest level of generality. Yet the values need
to be specified for different collectives, roles, etc., i.e., on lower levels, according to the
functions of the (sub)units of the given social system. Аnd this task will be performed by
means of norms. In other words, the inner differentiation of the social system requires —
due to the obligatory character of values — a relatively consistent system of norms, uni
formly formulated and interpreted. Norms are legitimated (and controlled) by the values
institutionalized in the society.
Арplying this conception to language, we state that the system of ends of any so
ciety includes the inevitable need for inter-social communication; and this aim implies,
necessarily, a common instrument of communication. SL, being exactly such an instrument,
constitutes a social value and as such it is institutionalized. Вut this fact does not deter
mine the particular form of SL. Аnd in fact, the aim of communication might be attained
by means of different languages or of different varieties of a language within the same
society. (This fact is very well known in many societies: there are moments in their his
tory, when they have to decide which language or variety to use as the common tool of
communication.) Тhe particular language variety as well as its possible subforms (diffe
rentiated according to specific social roles or functions) is determined by a norm (and
subnorms), the binding character of which is legitimated and sanctioned by the general
value of communicative tool in the overall system of social values. In other words: people
feel to be bound to use certain linguistic forms (and not others) because they experience
and acnowledge the neccesity and value of a relatively uniform system of common
communicative devices.
Тhus following Т. Раrsons' proposal, we may distinguish three different aspects
of a norm: (1) from the point of view of the members of the society who have internalized
it, the norm represents „the disposition of their (functional) needs"; (2) from the institu
tional aspect it appears as an integrative factor (integrating the linguistic behaviour of
individuals); (3) abstracted from particular situations and functions, it appears as a „value
standard".
** Some scholars make difference between "interindividual' ('intersubjective'),
and "collective", the first term referring to the interaction of the parts or members of a
social whole, the second to coherence of such parts or members. (Сf. Р. А. Verburg, Some
remarks on „Соmmunication" and „Social" in language theory, Linguа XI (1962), р.
453—468.)
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In the above considerations I have followed to a certain extent some sociological
views of several scholars belonging to the socalled functionalist school. In spite of certain
similarities which this approach bears to some basic principles of the Prague functional
linguistics, it should be pointed out that, in contradistinction to the „classical" Раrsonsian
conception, to a great extent dominated by the undialectic ideas of uniformity (integra
tedness) and static stability, our approach stresses the inner dialectic tension in any social
norm, revealing itself in the non-static (dynamic) character of SL norm, and in its syn
chronic variability (as well as in the inconsistency of the set of beliefs and attitudes towards
SL norm in a community).
Let us mention at least two critics of Parsons: Р.L. van den Веrghe (in his article
„Dialectic and functionalism: Тoward a theoretical synthesis", Атerican Sociological
Review, 28 (1963, p. 695—705) makes, e.g., an important distinction between "balance
(equilibrium) and "integration" on the one hand, and "stability" and "inertia on the other;
what is necessary, is a minimum of integratedness, but undue, excessive stability and iner
tia of certain elements of social structure may have as their conseduence an increasing
unbalance and a bad integration. (Examples from the domain of standardization might
be easily adduced). Тhe notion of „dynamic balance", to which a social system is striving
as to its limit, goes back to an idea of F. Еngels and has been in linguistics elaborated by
J. Vachek and applied by many Сzech and Slovak linguists. An interpretation of „dyna
mic balance" in terms of homeostasis (identified by some authors with goal-seeking) might
be of some interest. Аlso Веrghe's stress on the functional and dialectic interpretation of
change corresponds to the Prague views. — С. V. Мill’s criticism (op. с., ch. 2) concerns
mainly the problems of order and change; he emphasizes that the existence and import
of a "common value system as a mode of integration should not be overrated (his state
ment that „there is ... no one universal scheme in terms of which we can understand the
unity of social structure", p. 46/7, ressembles our view, expressed in the present paper,
that there is not one universal and panchronous functional scheme of language evalution),
and that the general problem of a theory of history cannot be separated from the general
problem of a theory of social structure" (p. 47) (a statement which might also characte
rize the Prague amendment of de Saussure's conception of language structure).
Тhe last remark concerns the relationship between "n or m" and "syste m".
I would stress that any natural language is, simultaneously, both system and norm, that
these two terms refer to different but complementary aspects of the same phenomenon.
Тhe dynamics of language ought to be sought for in the mutual conditioning of the system
and the norm.* Тhe systematic aspect concerns the structure of relations between the
sign-items of a semiotic whole, while the normative aspect takes into account the so
cially obligatory character of the rules of implementation of this system. Оne has only to
agree with Е. Сoseriu," when he argues (against Нjelmsley) that language systems appear
* Сf. also the discussion of these problems by L. I. Skvorcov and B. S. Svarckopf
in Aktualnyje probleту kultury redi, Мoskva 1970.
** Сf. Sinchronia, ..., p. 175, note 64 (of the Russian translation) and the article
Sistema, norma e „parola" in Studi linguistici in oпore di Иittore Pisani, Вrescia 1969, p.
235—253.— К. Ноralekin his article Jazykjako systém a norma, NR 55 (1972), pp. 65—68
agrees in principle with Сoseriu, but at the same time he rightly states that Сoseriu's
conception of the norm appears too narrow: the language norm is not only inherent in
the system, but it goes beyond it.
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as historically really existing systems, and not as merely hypothetic constructs. Оf course,
our formulation that the norm is egual to the rules of the obligatory implementation of
the system, takes the system as its point of departure purely for methodological reasons
(without any ontological and historical implication).
Аfter this rather extensive digression let us briefly analyze and cha
racterize the proposed three groups ofestimative standardization judgements.
(1) Аn instrument (or tool) is „a thing or person serving as a means
to an end" (see Webster’s „New World Dictionary"), so that language forms
or constructions (and their employment in utterances) may be estimated,
from this point ofview, only in respect to the way in which they comply with
the given end, in which they are capable to satisfy the particular functional
needs of the community. Вriefly speaking, as general evaluative criterion
appears function a l a de quacy. (The respective functions may
be of different kinds and on different levels of generality.) The basic pre
supposition of any adeguate language means is its social ne e d. Оne of the
important components of adequacy is efficien cy" (in a very broad
sense). All other, more specific properties of the communicative instrument,
often proclaimed as desirable, such as briefness, precision, definiteness,
explicitness, non-vagueness, truthfullness, etc., have no general validity,
since they are desirable in respect to some specific functions only. Instead
of adequacy a more common term su it a b i1ty might be used.
(2) In view of its systemic character, any language item and any varia
tion or change of it may be checked what a degree of systematicity
it shows. I.e., whether or how it accords with the existing rules of the given
1anguage, whether and how it contributes to the inner cohesion and dynamic
balance of the respective subsystem and the overall system as well. From
such an ascertainment the more or less central or peripheral position (cha
racter) of anyitem of a language system may be deduced.* Since the language
systemis phenomenon of dynamic character, itis necessary to ascertain whet
lneror how the given variation or change conforms with the tendencies of de
** It has been pointed out by P. S. Ray (op. c.); he calls it „the technology of stan
arrdization" and defines it „in the sense of maximal adaption to a specified range of ex
panse of human resource" (cf. Маrtinet's notion of „economy"). Аs specific criteria for
efficiency he adduces: linearity, systematicity, contrastive distinctiveness, transitional
probability, specialization, versatility. Ассоrding to Ray, efficiency corresponds to cheap
ness of an instrument, whereas rationality of language corresponds to dependability of
an instrument, and language commonalty to uniformity. -
** Тhe problems of the centre and periphery have been dealt with in a series of
articles published in TLP 2 (Prague 1966).
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velopment directed to a certain goal. Тhus, for instance, having a paradig
matic subsystem Рcontaining the forms (p1, p2, p3, p's, p4, ps) we have to
state the systemic character of a newly occurring form p'з. If our analysis
фiscovers an undeniable systemic tendency to reconstruct P into P', then
it is clear that p'a, appearing as less systematic and very peripheral in respect
to P, reveals central character in respect to Р. Аnd since the standardiza
tion decisions or recommendations have to take into account the SL dyna
mism and promote the prospective development of SL, the P' point of view
should be considered dominant. (In this context the notion of the „thera
peutic change", i.e. a change aiming at the restauration of an impaired sy
stemic balance, finds its place.)— Тhe traditional criterion of „regularity"
coincides with our criterion of systematicity only partially and roughly.
(3) The third criterion consists in the ascertainment of the ag re
ement (or desagreement) with the o b 1іg at o ry S L n or m.
What corresponds to the accepted norm is considered „right“, „correct",
„good (English, German, …)". Тhis criterion may be also reformulated as
„(social) acceptability". The norms differ as to their strictness (rigidity),
and span; these differences may be related to different realms of language,
to different realms of the functional employment of language, or to dife
rent SL. Тhus the orthographic norms are mostly very strict and rigid,
while the orthoepic norms are not so rigorously enforced (demanded) and
their span is obviously broader (i.e., the community is more tolerant to the
deviations in pronunciation than to those in spelling, and the norms of pro
nunciation contain several accepted alternatives /variations). Оn the border
1ine between acceptability and nonacceptability stand those 1anguage forms,
that are „tolerable". — Another important point is the functional (stylistic)
differentiation of the SL norm (or the existence of functional subnorms)
and the fact that some rules of the norm are not „prohibitive" (or „impe
rative"), but rather „preferential".
It is obvious that our three criteria are mutually autonomous, but
not hierarchically equivalent, since in cases of possible conflicts of criteria
(following from their autonomy) no resolution would be possible. From
a logical point of view, the instrumental criterion of adequacy should be
expected to occupy the hierarchically highest position. Вut in fact it is the
normative criterion that is dominant and decisive: any language form accep
ted by the given community and customarily used is regarded as „correct"
even if it is not (or, not quite) regular and not (fully) suitable or needful.
Тhis state of affairs is due to the fact that the linguistic behavior of people
is not exclusively controlled by rational motives (cf. here section 3.). Never
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theless, the dominance of custom over instrumentality is very often a see
ming one only, since it mostly appears more economic (and, consequently,
in accordance with the functional criterion of efficiency) to maintain a cus
tomary, though less adequate (and/or regular) form than to reject it and try
to introduce a new one. (In other words, the cost of outlay in abandonment
and acduisition exceeds the cost of maintenance over extended use — to
paraphrase P.S. Ray.) Оn the other hand, in the case of an innovation that
accords with the systemic rules, is functionally adequate, and has no com
peting counterpart in the existing norm, the criterion of norm cannot play
a significant role (and one may assume that the two criteria will not, in prin
ciple, come into a conflict).
3. In the preceeding section of our paper we have dealt with the pro
blems of objective, scientifically justified value judgments as a basis of lan
guage standardization. Вut it is not only the language standardizer who
expresses value-judgements: any speaker of a SL typically makes such sta
tements in the course of expressing his attitu de to SL. Тhose judge
ments are subjective, to be sure, but nevertheless they represent objective
social facts that necessarily ought to be taken into account by the standar
dizers. Оne of the leading members of the Prague Linguistic Circle has
mentioned as early as in 1932, that the attitude of a language community
to their own language represents an essential part of „le langage", besides
language system and „la parole".** Recently it has been pointed out by J.Р.
Rona (inspired by P. Garvin and М. Маthiot) that „the most fertile field
for sociolinguistics will … be found in attitude research".*
Тhe term „attitude" will be used here in its current sociological sense, namely as
a bias of a person or a community to prefer some ends and ways of conduct (and to reject
others), determining its (or their) response to a certain type of situation. Оn the scale of
generality attitude stands in the middle between the lower „motive" and the higher „orien
tation" (or „syndrom of attitudes"). (Тhe relation of „attitude" to „belief", interpreted by
different authors in various ways, I am leaving aside.)
Тhe set of attitudes of a language community to their SL represents
a system of interdependent items, but this system is not only very intricate,
but also inconsistent, containing antagonistic relationships and an internal
cialectic tension. Аny simplification or idealization of the factual state, to
which some sociologists as well as linguists are inclined, is undesirable and
** See: Spiosvтd ёestina a jazykova kultura, Praha 1932, p. 85.
** See: J. P. Rona, „А structural view of sociolinguistics", in: Меthod and Theory
in Linguistics (Р. Garvin, ed.), Тhe Наgue, 1970, p. 206.
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dangerous for an effective SL-standardization. In the subsequent paragraphs
I will only sketch a brief survey of the most significant attitudes. (А. more
detailed discussion of this topic may be found in some other papers of the
present author.*)
Тhe attitudes mostly occur in pairs of antithetical items, so that the
whole complex of attitudes of a given community is governed by a number
of antinomies. Тhe most important of them seem to be the following ones:
1. Far-reaching is the antinomy of ra ti o n а 1 vs. n o n - ra
ti o n а 1 orientation.
Тhe rational orientation comprises the instrumental and ethical atti
tudes and accentuates the instrumental character of SL, as well as the obli
gatory character of its collective norm. The instrumental functions of lan
guage are duly supported by the ethical attitudes, since any act of standar
dization and rationalization presupposes conformity and loyality of the
members of the given language community, motivated by the acceptance of
social integration as an ethical value.
Тhe non-rational orientation comprises the affective (emotional) and
traditional (customary) attitudes. Some aspects of this orientation are com
patible with the rational one, and should neither be neglected nor undere
stimated in the process of standardization. (Thus, e.g., a positive emotional
attitude, often associated with the ethical one, may be of great use in the
practical performance ofthe standardization decisions.) Оn the other hand,
decidedly anti-rational attitudes appear as undesirable, since they conflict
with linguistic and social progress. (In stating this, the author is aware of
the fact that he makes a commitment to a certain value standard, namely
to the idea of a society, in which emotions would be regulated by reason
to the benefit of all its members. Вut it seems to him that the objective ana
1ysis and evaluation of social history brings much evidence for this convic
tion).
2. With the first antinomy two minor, closely related pairs of at
titudes are in connection:
(а) Тhe first of them results from the opposition between the actual linguis
tic conduct of the speakers, and their opinions and convictions regarding
SL. Тhe speakers may, or may not, be aware of this contradiction. (In the
** Fr. Danes, „Dialektické tendence ve vyvoji spisovnych jazykй. Studie socio
lingvisticka", in: Сeskoslovenské pfedndsky pro VI. тезindrodni sjezd slavistй, Praha 1968,
pp. 119—128; Same, „Еinige soziolinguistische Aspekte der Schriftsprache", Die Welt
der Slaven XIII (1968), p. 17—27.
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first case we have to do with and unconscious imitation, in the second with
an intentional adaptation to an ideal.) (Сf the opposition between the
so-called „realistic" and „ideational" attitudes)
(b) Тhe second attitude is based on the contradiction between the actual,
cleep incentives of the speakers linguistic conduct and convictions on the
one hand, and their publically declared motives on the other. In other words,
people often disguise their (unconscious) incentives that are socially hardly
acceptable, while idealizing and rationalizing them.
3. Аnother major antinomy is that of resistance vs. accep
tance." Since the normal state of any natural language is that of flux,
this antinomy is of great significance. Neither rigid stability, nor complete
arbitrariness of change are compatible with any SL (cf. Маthesius para
doxical term „flexible stability" and the notion of „dynamic balance (equili
brium)", common in Praguian linguistics.) The language community tries
to retain the identity and existence of its SL, and conseduently resists those
changes which would, in their opinion, endanger this state." Вut in fact,
the act of recognition of a certain language variety as the (same) standard
language of the community in duestion is a predominantly sociological
act, to a high degree independent of the purely linguistic dualities of the
given variety. SL as a social institution contains as its essential component
the capability of adaptation to internal and external stimulation according
to certain structural principles. In other words, the notion of dynamic
balance (solving the said antinomy) presupposes a mechanism of linguistic
change.* (Сf. Engels invalidation of the principle of „abstract lidentity",
and Ray’s characteristic of SL in terms of „self-establishment" and „self
-transcendence".)
From the point of view of standardization it appears necessary to have at disposal
an institutional tool for regulating language change and controlling the dynamic balance.
It is the so-called codification of SL-norm that may be regarded as that tool. As we have
already mentioned in Section 2 of the present paper, in our conception the SL-codification
** Сf. М. М. Lewis, Language in Society, London 1947.
** Сf. Sturtevant's interesting observation that „... each language is a definite system
offorms employed in a definite way; for its users a language is static, although it is actually
changing all the time" (Ап introduction to Linguistic Science, p. 53).
** In this connection the distinction between synchrony — diachrony, and statics
— dynamics, as four autonomous dimensions, pointed out by D. Нуmes (cf. Language in
Сиlture and Society, 1964, p. 451), should be mentioned here. Нуmes rightly claims that
not only synchronic invariance and diachronic flux, but also a synchronic analysis of dy
namics (i.e., the structured variability, and the structure of the process of change) and a
diachronic analysis of statics (i.e., what appears from the historical point of view as stable)
ought to be studied.
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ought to be rather a kind of „directive" or „technica1 norm" than a rigid prescription or
regulation." (In fact, codification is either of them: as a prescription or regulation it must
be issued by a norm-authority, it needs to be promulgated; and in order to make it effec
tive, the authority may sometimes (e.g., in schools) attach a sanction (different from the
intrinsic social sanctions of the SL-norm). Аs a directive or technical norm it is concerned
with the means recommended to be used for the sake of attaining a certain end; it appeals
to user's reasoning, to his rationality, telling him: „If you want to express yourself in a
standard way (what appears desirable for the following reasons ...), you ought to employ
certain language means in a certain way and to avoid others".
4. Аnother pair of antithetical attitudes is the antinomy of is o1 а
tion is m (divergency) vs. u niversa1 is m (convergency). Тhe for
mer is motivated mainly by the separatist function of SL,50 the latter by the
fact of language contacts and of the necessity to enrich SL.
5. Finally we would like to mention the antinomy of u ni for mity
vs. variation. (It must not be identified with the opposition of sta
bility and change (diachronic variability): for example one can imagine
changes aiming at uniformity, or changes bringing forth a diversification.
Вut in standardization practice, unification goes hand in hand with stabi
1ization.) Тhe old ideal (or idol) of a neatly uniform (as well as absolutely
stable) SL is untenable and false." Воih antithetical tendencies result in a
patterned differentiation of linguistic means (i.e., in a functionally regula
ted variation).
In any language community, the mentioned antagonistic attitudes are
brought into a temporary (dynamic) balance by means of an accepted value
pattern. (Сf Section 2, p. 13 f. of the present paper.) It should be noted, how
ever, that such patterns are never universal or panchronic. Тhey depend
on the particular sociolinguistic situation and may be different not only in
different communities, but also in different historical stages of the same com
munity. Аs we have already mentioned, even the supposition of a single
value pattern, accepted by the whole community (in a certain moment of
its existence) as its integrating power, is doubtful. It is very probable that
** I am referring to the distinction made by G. Н. von Wright in his book Norm
and Action, London 1963.
** Р. Garvin and М. Маthiot (cf. Тhe Standard Language Problem, p. 155) de
signate as „separatist" the function of SL to set off a speech community as separate from
its neighbours. (The other symbolic SL-functions are according to the same authors the
unifying and prestige function; the frame-of-reference function is considered an objec
tive one.)
* Some problems of uniformity has been dealt with, in an unsatisfying manner,
by J. О. Нertzler („Social uniformation and language", in: Explorations in Sociolingustics,
Вloomington and The Наgue 1966).
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in every community there co-exist several such patterns, competing and
conflicting, but one of them mostly appears as dominant (or representative).
(Аn example of conflicting value standards applied to standardization va
lue-judgements is represented by the well known discussion between the
progressive Czech functionalists and traditional Czech purists in early thir
ties. The functionalists position might be characterized in terms of the A-set
of variables of the value pattern, while the position of the other group in
terms of the В-set. The value standard of the „ordinary native speaker"
appears less clear and definite.) In my opinion, the standardizer, even if he
rightly adheresto the scientifically justified functionalist.approach, may neglect
neither the real sociolinguistic situation of the community, nor the „public
linguistic opinion" (though he may try to reeducate it), if his standardiza
tion decisions or recommendations have to be realistic and promise a suc
cessful result.
Тhe empirical research by means of sociological procedures of the
attitudes of the speech community towards SL (advocated by P. Garvin and
М. Маthiot as early as in 1956 and interpreted from the viewpoint of the
Мarxist scientific methodology by A. D. Svejcer*), has been prepared by
the Institute of the Czech Language of the Czechoslovak Academy of Scien
ces, Prague. In 1968 we have tried to find out the attitudes toward the Czech
orthographical rules and the different possibilities of a spelling reform. The
second induiry, concerning the attitudes toward the „foreign words", was
accomplished in 1970. Тhe results of the two inquiries has been described
and interpreted by А. Тeinor.** The experience from these two attempts
shows that such a sociological research is fairly possible and brings very
interesting and important outcomes."
Frantisek Danes
** Сf. Р. Garvin — М. Маthiot, „The urbanization of the Guarani language",
in: Proceedings of the 5th International Соngress of Anthropological and Ethnological Scien
ces (1956), Philadelphia 1960. Тhe authors listed the following typical attitudes: (1) lo
yality (a protective and defensive a.), linked to the unifying and separatist function of
SL (and to the broader attitude of nationalism), (2) pride (a positive a.), linked to the pre
stige function, (3) awareness of the norm, linked to the frame-of-reference function. —
А. D. Svejcer, Voprosy sociologii iazyka o sovremennoj aтerikanskoj lingvistike, Lenin
grad 1971.
** Тhe research has been accomplished in collaboration with the Institute for the
research of public opinion of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences. Сf.: А. Те)nor,
„Сesky pravopis a vetejné minёni", NR 52 (1969), p. 265 ff. — А. Тeinor a kol., „Рfejata
slova a vetejné minёni", NR 55 (1972), p. 185 ff.
** Сf. also R. Вuchtelova, „Рfispёvek kaplikaci některych socioligickych metod
na vyzkum vyslovnosti slov pfejatych", SaS 32 (1971), p. 45—54.
Values and attitudes in language standardization 27
Р е 3 и ме
Ф р а н т и ш е к Да н е ш
вРЕДности и СтАвови ПРИликом JEзичКЕ СТАндАРДизАциуЕ
Процес jезичке стандардизациje подразумева три фазе: дескрип
тивну, нормативну (регулативну) и перформативну. Прашка школа je
допринелада се оне с теориjске тачке гледишта студиозно осветле. Оста
je, меhутим, да се неки концепти joш више продубе, односно прецизниje
саглeдajy. Аутор овог пута преузима на себе задатaк дa далье развиje
теориjску мисао прашке школе у два правца: (1) утвphиваньем критериja
по кофима he ce спознати дали je могуhe или не обjективно, т). научно
фундирано вреднованье jезичких поiaва подвргнутих контроли струч
ньака; (2) истраживаньем фактора под чиjим се утицаjем формирajу ста
вови говорне заjеднишe пpeмa jезику коjим се служи.
По аутору, општи вредносни критери) требало би пре свега да
узима у обзир функционалну адекватност jезичке побединости о коjoj
се расправльа, т). умесностньене поiaвe под датим социjално-лингвистич
ким околностима. Осим тога, будуhи да je сам jезик систем, она би се
морала испитати и с обзиром на степен систематичности коiи испольава.
Наjзад, потребно je утврдити да ли она стоiи у пуно; сагласности са
оним што je вeh постоieha норма у jезику. Што сетиче става говорних
представника према сопственом jезичком изразу, он никако ниje за
потценьиванье; о ньему стручныак приликом нормативних интервенциja
мора повести рачуна. Таj став ниje у свакоj прилици рационално засно
ван. Неизбежна суту и антирационална определьеньа (изазвана каквим
емоционалним доживльаjем, односно везаношhy ca увреженом тради
цифом). Ни ныих стручныаци не смефу превиhати. Аутор, далье, скреhe
пажныy на спрегу антагонистичких тенденциja (изолационализам/уни
верзализам, итд.), кофе неминовно узимаjу маха при развоiу стандард
них jезика, инкорпорирajyhи их у репертоар оних проблемских подручja
чиіе прецизниje осветльаванье спада у непосредне задатке савремене
социолингвистичке теориje.
